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Abstract
One of the major input for evaluating a Credit Default Swap (CDS) position is the so-called CDS
curve. This curve gives the term structure of the CDS: for some maturities (typically: 1 year, 2 years,
3 years, 4 years, 5 years, 7 years and 10 years) a market spread is given. The spread is the premium to
pay to a counterparty to protect one unit of currency during one year.
Most of the time, CDS curves are increasing: the larger the maturity (i.e. the longer the time period
we want to protect against a credit event), the larger the spread. As from the beginning of the Credit
crisis (Summer 2007), some CDS curves were reverted, meaning that they contained decreasing parts: the
spread (premium given on an annual basis) to pay for having protection for m1 years is larger than the
spread to pay for having protection for m2 > m1 years. In some pathological cases, when the reversion is
quite important, these reverted curves caused the blocking of some CDS pricers. The goal of this report
is to understand these pricer blockings from a practical and quantitative perspective.
Our analysis is based on a market-driven model for pricing CDS products, assuming a piecewise linear
cumulative density function for the implied default probabilities. In spite of its simplicity, the model is
quite general because only few assumptions are made, and provides manageable closed-form expressions
for some interesting quantities. In this paper, the following key results will be derived:
• Closed-form solutions are obtained for some important quantities, allowing a deep understanding
of the eﬀects of the underlying parameters;
• It is shown that there is no theoretical objection to the existence of decreasing parts in CDS curves;
• However, indeed, there exists a threshold on the intensity of these reversions : the CDS curves
cannot contain parts being arbitrarily decreasing. If the CDS curve contains too strongly reverted
parts than allowed (according to the above-mentioned threshold), then it is natural that the pricer
fails to return a valid cumulative default probability curve;
• Finally, a business meaning of this “reverting threshold” is given in terms of arbitrage opportunities.
Note: This paper suits to anyone being interested in credit derivatives product, and does not require
any speciﬁc prerequise.
1 Introduction
A Credit Default Swap (CDS) on a company n is a ﬁnancial product in which a protection buyer agrees to
pay as from the eﬀective date t0 till the maturity date t? periodic premiums at some standardized coupon
dates t1,...,tN falling between these two dates to a protection seller (with tN = t?). The company n is
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Figure 1: CDS curves for Residential Capital LLC for quoted dates 2007/07/10, 2007/07/31 and 2007/08/20.
The spread values are given in bps (Y -axis) for each available maturity (X-axis). The dashed curve is linked
to the right-hand side axis. The curves are obtained through linear interpolation between market quotes
(labeled with markers).
assumed to not default before t0, otherwise, the transaction is canceled. If n defaults at t0 6 τ 6 t?, then
only the premiums for the coupon dates coming before τ will be paid by the protection buyer, and a ﬁnal
payment is made to cover the protection oﬀered between τ and the previous coupon date. If n defaults
between t0 and t?, the protection seller agrees to pay an amount covering the losses of n to the protection
buyer at the next coupon date after τ. If n does not default before t?, then all the premiums are due. On
the other hand, in that case, the protection seller does not have to pay anything. In the above transaction,
we assume that the protection also covers the days t0 and t?. The net present value (NPV) of the payments
made by the protection buyer is called the Fee leg, while the total value of the payment made by the
protection seller is the Contingent leg. These legs depend, among other, on the protection duration. The
periodic payments are proportional to a spread, which is given for a speciﬁc maturity. For each CDS, several
spreads are quoted: one for each of the available maturities. The curve built by plotting the spreads with
respect to their associated maturity is called the CDS curve. Figure 1 gives such CDS curves related to the
company Residential Capital LLC quoted on three diﬀerent dates. On one given curve, the value associated
to each marker is the market spreads (in bps) for the corresponding protection duration. The curves show
the linear interpolation between these quoted values. For more details about CDS, we refer to the handbooks
[Francis C. et al. (2003)], [Masters B. et al. (2000)] and the books [Bieleki T.R. and Rutkowski M. (2005)],
[Choudhry M. (2006)].
Since the last few months some CDS spread tend to deviate from their average level (Fig . 1 shows that
the average spread level of Residential Capital LLC widened by a factor 8 between July 10th and August
20th at the beginning of the 2007 Summer Crisis). Very high spreads have been observed for some names
involved in CDS deals. But more surprisingly than this observed “upper shift” of the CDS curve, the shape
of these curves became unusual. Indeed, in the past, they used to have an increasing trend : the longer the
protection period, the larger the spread (see e.g. the CDS curve labeled with “” markers on Fig. 1). This
2Available at www.defaultrisk.com
smoothly increasing trend was intuitively understood as the increasing price to pay for a longer protection
period. Consequently, some analysts were surprised to recently observe CDS curves containing decreasing
parts (see e.g. the CDS curve labeled with “” or “4” markers on Fig. 1). Also, quantitative analysts came
into troubles when their CDS pricers started to fail to return valid default probabilities. Apparently, most
of the CDS pricers blocked on CDS curves that included strongly decreasing parts.
The goal of this report is to understand these pricer blockings from a practical and quantitative per-
spective. To that end, we propose a three-fold analysis. First, in Section 2 a practical model for pricing
CDS products is proposed. It includes common market conventions: for example, cash ﬂows can only
happen at speciﬁc coupon dates, a discrete-time world (day to day) is assumed. The model assumes a
piecewise linear cumulative default probability function. In spite of its linearity, however, the model is quite
general, and leads to results being pretty well in line with more involved models (some examples of alter-
native models can be found in [Hull J.C. and White A. (2003)], [Hull J.C. et al. (2004)] [Cariboni (2004)],
[Bieleki T.R. et al. (2005)], [Bieleki T.R. and Rutkowski M. (2005)] and references therein). We do believe
that this is a consequence of that few assumptions are needed to derive it. Another advantage of focus-
ing on such a simple model is that closed-form expressions can be found. In the second part of the paper
(Section 3), we investigate, from both qualitative and quantitative points of view, the possibility for a CDS
curve to have decreasing parts. Finally, an analytical threshold is given for the CDS curve reversion, and
the pricer blockings are explained according to this value. Further, a business meaning is proposed for this
threshold (and consequently for the pricer blockings) in terms of arbitrage opportunities (Section 4).
The following “contract conventions” are made in our developments:
Conv1 The time scale is discrete, not continuous. This is, in practice, a very natural practical convention:
we need to pick up a precise moment for the beginning and the end of the transactions, and to act
a possible credit event. This is not possible to do, in practice, on a continuous scale. Therefore, the
counterparties have to agree on the (maximum) resolution of this time scale. Evolving in time by a
day-to-day scale is certainly the most common convention (in case of credit event, for instance, only
the default date will matter: any further time information about when the default would have occurred
during that day will be discarded). Consequently, we will also adopt this time resolution, so that only
dates matters in computing the cashﬂows1;
Conv2 cash ﬂows can only be made on speciﬁc (agreed beforehand) coupon dates;
Conv3 we assume a constant number of days in a year (noted γ);
Similarly, the pricing model assumes the following:
Ass1 the bid/ask spreads are the same;
Ass2 the cumulative default probability curve is linear between each of the possible maturity dates (piecewise
linear). This is nothing but assuming a parametric family for this curve;
Ass3 the market is eﬃcient : the spreads reﬂects the ask-and-demand law (hence, liquidity is assumed),
there is no arbitrage opportunities “in expected value”, ...
2 A simple model to infer cumulative default probabilities from
CDS curves
Assume we are on date t0 and that we observe a CDS on a name n with spreads available for the m following
maturities: y1-year, y2-years, ..., ym-years where yi stands for a natural number. Practically, the above
1This assumption does not entail the generality of the approach, which can easily be extended to a further time scale (hours,
minutes,...). However, days are used in the following as the chosen time unit.
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contracts deal with protection against a credit event of n till, respectively t?
1 = t0+y1 years, t?
2 = t0+y2 years,
...
Typical values are y1 = 1, y2 = 2, y3 = 3, y4 = 5 and y5 = 10 (leading to m = 5). At a given time, say
t0, a set of spreads is available for the name n:
sp1(n,t0), sp2(n,t0), sp3(n,t0), sp4(n,t0) and sp5(n,t0) .
The spreads are given on an annual basis under a given convention about the number of days in a year,
noted γ (e.g. γ = 360).
For clarity, the computation of the cumulative default probability function for a given name n will be
splitted in two steps. We start by focusing on the ﬁrst maturity for which the spread is available (say y1).
We then consider the remaining maturities by iterating on the results obtained for the previous maturities.
2.1 First available maturity
The goal hereafter is to ﬁnd the (cumulative) default probability at some future date ti for the ﬁrst maturity
y1 implied by the market. More precisely, we assume that the protection on n for that contract starts at
t0 and ends at t?
1 (t0 included, t?
1 excluded). In this section, we will answer the following question: how to
ﬁnd today, on date t0, the probability that name n will default between t0 and t?
1, noted p1(n,[t0,t?
1[) ? We
will proceed step wise, by computing the probability that a name will default between two dates ti−1 and ti.
These probabilities will be noted p1(n,[ti−1,ti[).2 Because of assumption Ass3, the spread quote sp1(n,t0)
is such that there must be no a priori looser or winner in the transaction. Mathematically, this implies that
the NPV of the expected Fee leg must equal the NPV of the expected Contingent leg: the two counterparties
are expecting a zero Mark-To-Market (MtM) if they would have to enter a CDS contract according to these
spreads today, at t0. Hence, p1(n,[t0,ti[) is seen as a tuning parameter for adjusting the MtM to zero; its
value is set according to the following formula:
p1(n,[t0,ti[) = p s.t. N{E[FeeLeg(n,t0,ti,...),...]} = N{E[CgtLeg(n,t0,ti,...),...]} ,
in which E[E] denotes the expectation of the stochastic expression E (which depends on the probability
parameter p, see below), N{C} stands for the net present value of the cash ﬂow C, and FeeLeg(n,t0,ti,...)
and CgtLeg(n,t0,ti,...) are the Fee and Contingent legs, respectively, that both depend on some parameters.
Let us now focus on the computation of p1(n,[t0,t?
1[). In the following two subsections, we shall derive
an expression (corresponding to our model for the distribution function of the default probabilities) for the
expected Contingent and expected Fee legs.
2.1.1 Computation of the Contingent Leg
Let us deﬁne τ > t0 the random variable describing the date on which n will default. Then,
E[CgtLeg(n,t0,t?
1,...),...] = 0 × P(τ > t?
1)
| {z }
if no default
+not(n)(1 − rec(n)) × P(τ 6 t?
1))
| {z }
if default
,
where rec(n) is the recovered amount when n defaults, and consequently, not(n)(1 − rec(n)) are the
protected losses given default.
2the bracket on the right of “[ti−1,ti[” means that ti is not included. This is to avoid to count several times the eﬀect of
a default at ti when summing these probabilities. This convention, combined to the fact that protection ends right before t?
i
will allow us to not particularize this case in the summations, and consequently, to simplify the notations. As an example,
p1(n,[t0,t?
1[) =
P
i p1(n,[ti−1,ti[) where the sum ranges over the dates ti−1,ti such that t0 6 ti−1 < ti 6 t?
1
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The NPV of this term can be rewritten as
N{E[CgtLeg(n,t0,t?
1,...),...]} = N



not(n)(1 − rec(n))
X
t06ti−1<ti<t?
1
P(τ = ti)



= not(n)(1 − rec(n))
X
t06ti6t?
1
p1(n,[ti−1,ti[)δ(dtie) , (1)
where ti and ti−1 mean any consecutive days between the eﬀective and maturity date, dtie is the next coupon
date after ti and δ(t) is the discount factor that will be applied if a default occurs on t, quoted at t0.
According to the convention Conv2, the Contingent leg will be paid only if n defaults before t?
1, and the
corresponding cash ﬂow will occur on the ﬁrst coupon date after the date of the default. The set of coupon
dates for the ﬁrst maturity of the CDS is noted T (1) (it includes the dates t0 and t?
1), where the argument
of T (·) refers to the fact that we are dealing with the ﬁrst available spread sp1(n,t0) (i.e. the ﬁrst maturity
date).
At this step however, the problem seems yet more complicated than the original one: instead of having to
estimate one default probability, we are led to estimate ][T (1)] − 1 default probabilities, where ][S] denotes
the number of elements in the set S. Here plays the linear assumption for default probability. We parametrize
each of the above probabilities p1(n,[ti−1,ti[) as a linear function of a single default probability p such that
p1(n,[ti−1,ti[) . = p
ti − ti−1
t?
1 − t0
, (2)
and, by deﬁnition, p = p1(n,[t0,t?
1[) is the probability that n defaults before t?
1 knowing that it survives till
t0. Mathematically, this assumption corresponds to a uniformity of the default occurrences between t0 and
t?
1. As an illustration, whatever is i, p1(n,[ti−1,ti[) remains the same provided that the time gap (in days)
between ti−1 and ti does not depend on i. For example, the probability to observe a default in [t0,t?
1/2[ is
half the probability to observe a default in [t0,t?
1[.
For simplifying the notation, let us deﬁne the shorthand notation “
X
T (1)
” for meaning that the summation
is performed on each coupon date, that is for “
X
t06ti−1<ti6t?
1
” where {ti−1,ti} ⊆ T (1). Hence, with eq. (2) in
mind and because of Conv2, the NPV of the expected Contingent leg can be expressed as a sum over coupon
dates only, and reduces to3
N {E[CgtLeg(n,t0,t?
1,...),...]} = pnot(n)(1 − rec(n))
X
T (1)
ti − ti−1
t?
1 − t0
δ(ti) . (3)
2.1.2 Computation of the Fee Leg
The spreads are assumed to be paid on an annual basis. Hence, the amount to be paid at a coupon date
ti ∈ T (.) is (in case of no default)
ti−ti−1
γ sp1(n,t0)not(n) where
ti−ti−1
γ is the number of years (according
to our convention) between the two consecutive coupon dates ti−1 and ti. The expected cash ﬂow for the
Fee leg, at each coupon dates, is (see the Appendix for more detailed calculations)
0 × P(τ < ti−1) +
∆i
γ
sp1(n,t0)not(n)P(ti−1 6 τ < ti) +
ti − ti−1
γ
sp1(n,t0)not(n)P(τ > ti) , (4)
3In this equation, ti and ti−1 denote consecutive coupon dates in T (1), instead of any consecutive days between t0 and t?
1,
as it was the case in equation 2.
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where ∆i is deﬁned as the expected number of days between ti−1 and the default date when the default
occurs in the time interval [ti−1,ti[:
∆i
. = E[τ −ti−1|ti−1 6 τ < ti]
and satisﬁes 0 6 ∆i 6 ti − ti−1. In equation (4), each term denotes the expected amount to pay for the
protection between ti−1 and ti depending on when the possible credit event will occur : either the default
occurs before ti−1 (ﬁrst term), or during that period (second term) or, ﬁnally, after ti (third term). By
playing with ∆i, one actually tunes the cumulative probability function: by tuning it between 0 to ti −ti−1,
the cumulative probability function between those dates is made non-linear. Obviously, this parameter is
also inferred by our “piecewise linear” model (see Appendix 7.2). The advantage of this formulation is that
the protection buyer can have best and worst cases when the name defaults in that interval by setting ∆i ← 0
and ∆i ← (ti − ti−1), respectively (the reverse holds true for the protection seller).
A quite good approximation of ∆i according to our model is ∆i = (ti−ti−1)/2, meaning that if a default
occurs between ti−1 and ti, it will happen in the middle of two coupon dates. This is because i) we assume
a uniform distribution for credit event between the coupon dates (Ass2), and ii) only discount factor δ(ti) is
involved in the payments related to that time interval (Conv2). The expected payments is simply the sum
of the above probabilized amounts which, using our notations for the default probabilities is:
sp1(n,t0)not(n)δ(ti)
∆i
γ
×(p1(n,[t0,ti[)−p1(n,[t0,ti−1[))+sp1(n,t0)not(n)δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ
×(1−p1(n,[t0,ti[)) .
Using our linear model for the probabilities given in eq. (2), the above expression can be simpliﬁed as
sp1(n,t0)not(n)δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ

1 − p
ti − t0 − ∆i
t?
1 − t0

.
This term is the discounted expected value of the Fee leg payment regarding the period between the ti−1
and ti coupon dates4.
By summing over the periods between the consecutive coupon dates involved in the contract, one gets
our NPV of the Fee leg payment:
N {E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
1,...),...]} = sp1(n,t0)not(n)
X
T (1)

δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ

1 − p
ti − t0 − ∆i
t?
1 − t0

. (5)
2.1.3 Computation of the Default probability
By equating the NPV of the above expected Fee and Contingent legs (which is equivalent to ﬁnd the value
of p yielding a zero MtM at time t0), one gets that the corresponding value of p is
p?
1 =
sp1(n,t0)
P
T (1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ
P
T (1)
h
(1 − rec(n))
ti−ti−1
t?
1−t0 δ(ti) + sp1(n,t0)δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ

ti−t0−∆i
t?
1−t0
i (6)
and we conclude that
p1(n,[t0,t?
1]) ← p?
1
2.2 Remaining maturities
Assume we are dealing with the k-th maturity (k > 1), meaning that we have already found p?
1,...,p?
k−1, the
cumulative default probabilities for maturities y1,...,yk−1 with maturity dates t?
1,...,t?
k−1. Let us compute
the Contingent and the Fee legs exploiting this information.
4Similar developments can be used to ﬁnd the expression of this term for the remaining maturities (k > 1).
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2.2.1 Computation of the Contingent Leg
The Contingent leg is trivially obtained from the above results. Similarly as T (1), we deﬁne T (k) as
the set of dates containing t0 and all the coupon dates between t0 and t?
k. Hence, using the summation
symbol
X
T (j)\T (j−1)
(with j > 1) for meaning that the sum is taken over the coupon dates ti−1,ti satisfying
t?
j−1 6 ti−1 < ti 6 t?
j, one gets
N {E[CgtLeg(n,t0,t?
k,...),...]} = not(n)(1 − rec(n)) ×



p?
1
X
T (1)
ti − ti−1
t?
1 − t0
δ(ti)
+(p?
2 − p?
1)
X
T (2)\T (1)
ti − ti−1
t?
2 − t?
1
δ(ti)
+...
+(p?
k−1 − p?
k−2)
X
T (k−1)\T (k−2)
ti − ti−1
t?
k−1 − t?
k−2
δ(ti)
+(p − p?
k−1)
X
T (k)\T (k−1)
ti − ti−1
t?
k − t?
k−1
δ(ti)



.
This expression can be simpliﬁed as
N {E[CgtLeg(n,t0,t?
k,...),...]} = N

E[CgtLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]
	
+(p − p?
k−1)not(n)(1 − rec(n))
X
T (k)\T (k−1)
ti − ti−1
t?
k − t?
k−1
δ(ti) .
(7)
Indeed, there is no reason that the parameters valid for a date t0 6 ti 6 t?
1 when computing a CDS
with maturity t?
1 are not the same, on the same date, when pricing a CDS with maturity date t?
2 > t?
1 (the
recovery, the notional, the coupon dates before t?
1 and the corresponding default probabilities must stay what
they are). However, an additional term starts to play, explaining the diﬀerence between the two CDS prices.
2.2.2 Computation of the Fee Leg
Regarding the Fee leg, one has
N {E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k,...),...]} = spk(n,t0)not(n) ×



X
T (1)
h
δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ

1 − p?
1

ti − t0 − ∆i
t?
1 − t0
i
+
X
T (2)\T (1)
h
δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ

1 −
h
p?
1 + (p?
2 − p?
1)

ti − t?
1 − ∆i
t?
2 − t?
1
ii
+...
+
X
T (k−1)\T (k−2)
h
δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ

1 −
h
p?
k−2 + (p?
k−1 − p?
k−2)

ti − t?
k−2 − ∆i
t?
k−1 − t?
k−2
ii
+
X
T (k)\T (k−1)
h
δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ

1 −
h
p?
k−1 + (p − p?
k−1)

ti − t?
k−1 − ∆i
t?
k − t?
k−1
ii



.
7Available at www.defaultrisk.com
Figure 2: Evolution of the cumulative default probability of CDS on n vs time (in this example, the number
m of available spreads is 5).
Few algebraic manipulation yields easily
N {E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k,...),...]} =
spk(n,t0)
spk−1(n,t0)
N

E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]
	
+spk(n,t0)not(n) ×
X
T (k)\T (k−1)
h
δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ

1 −
h
p?
k−1 + (p − p?
k−1)

ti − t?
k−1 − ∆i
t?
k − t?
k−1
ii
.
(8)
In this leg, all the fees for the payment dates prior to t?
k−1 remain unchanged for a further maturity,
except that the corresponding spreads changed from spk−1(n,t0) to spk(n,t0), which requires an adjustment.
Further, a new term is involved to cover the period [t?
k−1,t?
k[.
2.2.3 Computation of the cumulative Default probability p?
k = pk(n,[t0,t?[)
As usual, the probability that n will default before t?
k is given by p such that the MtM is zero, i.e.:
N {E[CgtLeg(n,t0,t?
k,...),...]} = N {E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k,...),...]}
This speciﬁc value for p is noted p?
k. Our cumulative default probability of n, pk(n,[t0,t?
k[) will be set equal
to p?
k.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the (piecewise linear) cumulative default probability of n vs time under
the linearized model. We adopt the convention that p(n,[t0,t0[) = 0, and that the cdf is linear in the time
interval [t?
m,t?
∞[ with t?
m the last maturity date for which a spread is available; t?
∞ is the threshold date
before which we are sure, according to our linear model, that n will default. The slope of the cumulative
default probability of n in [t?
m,t?
∞[ is set as the same as the one in [t?
m−1,t?
m[. Obviously, p(n,[t?
∞,∞[) = 0
so that p(n,[t0,t?
∞[) = p(n,[t0,∞[) = 1.
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Let us now compute the closed-form solution for p?
k (remind that everything is linear in p). By using
the assumption that the previous cumulative default probability was such that the MtM for the k − 1-th
maturity was zero, then
N

E[CgtLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]
	
= N

E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]
	
and, from eq.(3), (7) and (8), it is seen that p?
k satisﬁes
(p?
k − p?
k−1)
X
T (k)\T (k−1)
ti − ti−1
t?
k − t?
k−1
δ(ti)(1 − rec(n))not(n) =
N{E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]}
spk(n,t0) − spk−1(n,t0)
spk−1(n,t0)
+spk(n,t0)not(n)
X
T (k)\T (k−1)
n
δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ
h
1 −

p?
k−1 + (p?
k − p?
k−1)
ti − t?
k−1 − ∆i
t?
k − t?
k−1
io
i.e.
p?
k = p?
k−1 +
N{E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t
?
k−1,...),...]}
(1−rec(n))not(n)
spk(n,t0)−spk−1(n,t0)
spk−1(n,t0) +
spk(n,t0)
1−rec(n)(1 − p?
k−1)
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ
P
T (k)\T (k−1)
ti−ti−1
t?
k−t?
k−1δ(ti) +
spk(n,t0)
1−rec(n)
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ

ti−t?
k−1−∆i
t?
k−t?
k−1
 ,
(9)
3 About the CDS reverting curves
In this section, the previously developed model will be used for analyzing whether a CDS curve can be
arbitrarily reverted. In the ﬁrst subsection, qualitative arguments will be given, showing that there must
exist a threshold on the reversion intensity. Hopefully, this ﬁrst step will convince the reader that the
existence of such a threshold is very natural. In the second subsection, a rigorous theoretical development
is proposed, yielding the analytical expression of this threshold.
3.1 Qualitative analysis
In order to understand the impact of the shape of CDS curve (increasing, constant, decreasing), and to
prove that there must exist a threshold on the reversion intensity, we will compare four study cases. Let
us consider two arbitrary maturities, m1,m2 satisfying m2 > m1. We will compare the Fee leg cash ﬂows
for the CDS with maturity m1 and spread spm1(n,t0) to the CDS with maturity m2 and a varying spread
spm2(n,t0). This study will show that if we note spm2(n,t0) = spm1(n,t0)−ξ where ξ > 0 then there exists
an upper bound for ξ lower than spm1(n,t0), i.e. a lower bound for spm2(n,t0) in order to avoid arbitrage
opportunities.
3.1.1 Case 1: spm2(n,t0) > spm1(n,t0)
Assume a given default time τ. Whatever is τ the total amount paid for a m2-year protection buyer will
be larger than for the m1-year protection buyer. This larger price results from the higher credit risk. The
evolution of the total payment made is plotted on Figure 3(a).
3.1.2 Case 2: spm2(n,t0) = spm1(n,t0)
Assume a given default time τ. Whatever is τ 6 t0 + m1years, the total amount paid for a m2-year
protection buyer will be the same than for the m1-year protection buyer. Whatever is τ > t0 + m1years,
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(a) Case 1 (b) Case 2
(c) Case 3 (d) Case 4
Figure 3: Four study cases. Evolution of the total Fee leg payments in time in case of no-default. These
payments are made only at coupon dates. The continuous curve shows the m2-year maturity CDS contract,
the dashed curve the m1-year (m1 < m2) maturity CDS contract. The length of the arrows is proportional
to the value of the spread. The amounts corresponding to the intersection of these curves with the vertical
dotted lines plotted at time τ1,τ2,τ3 indicate the total amount to pay in case of default at this time (note
that, rigorously speaking, this amount has to be accrued by some small amount for the protection period
oﬀered between the default time τ and the previous coupon date, say ti, which is (τ − ti)/γ spmi(n,t0)(1 −
rec(n))not(n)). The fourth case is very speciﬁc since the m2 contract is deterministically more interesting
than the m1 one.
10Available at www.defaultrisk.com
the total amount paid for a m2-year protection buyer will be larger than for the m1-year protection buyer.
Again, these situations are very natural: you pay the same amount by unit of time in the two cases. The
evolution of the total payment made is plotted on Figure 3(b).
3.1.3 Case 3: spm2(n,t0) < spm1(n,t0) but spm2(n,t0) ≈ spm1(n,t0)
In this case, we assume that spm2(n,t0) is a bit lower than spm1(n,t0). This analysis aims at showing
whether any value for spm2(n,t0) lower than spm1(n,t0) yields speciﬁc results. Assume a given default time
τ. Then, if τ < t0 + m1 years the total amount paid for a m2-year protection buyer will be smaller than for
the m1-year protection buyer. On the other hand, if τ > t0 +m1 years+ξ for some ξ > 0, then it is possible
that the total amount paid for the m2-year protection buyer becomes larger. Then, it may be interesting
for a trader to choose either the m1-year or the m2-year CDS contract depending on the view he has on the
default time. Hence, there is no reason for constraining the inequality spm2(n,t0) > spm1(n,t0) to hold true
in all the cases. The evolution of the total payment made is plotted on Figure 3(c).
3.1.4 Case 4: spm2(n,t0) << spm1(n,t0)
Here, we assume a very low spm2(n,t0) compared to spm1(n,t0). If spm2(n,t0) is suﬃciently small, then it can
be seen that whenever is the default, the total amount paid by the m2-year protection buyer will be smaller
than the total amount paid by the m1-year protection buyer. In other words, there is no advantage to buy
the m1-year protection contract knowing that such a m2-year protection contract exists. Yet another way
to see things is that there is an arbitrage opportunity. Assume a trader buys the m2-year CDS contract and
sells the m1-year protection contract. With that position, the sign of the MtM of this position is no longer
stochastic: our trader is sure to have a positive gain (but the amount remains stochastic). Furthermore, he
will receive a protection against a credit event on the time period starting at t0 + m1 years and ending at
t0 + m2 years for free. This is illustrated in Figure 3(d).
Our above qualitative analysis shows that there must be a threshold value on spm2(n,t0) depending on
spm1(n,t0), whatever are the maturities m2 > m1 and spm1(n,t0). It cannot be arbitrarily lower than the
spread spm1(n,t0).
3.2 Quantitative analysis
The question here is “Can the minimum value for spk(n,t0) such that p?
k > p?
k−1 be lower than spk−1(n,t0)
?” The previous qualitative analysis indicates that the answer is yes. Let us check that mathematically, and
look for the analytical value of this lower bound on spk(n,t0).
Since p?
k denotes a cumulative default probability, it is obvious that p?
k must satisfy p?
k > p?
k−1. How-
ever, from equation (9), it is clear that this condition might be violated if the relative spread diﬀerences
spk(n,t0)−spk−1(n,t0)
spk−1(n,t0) becomes so negative that the whole numerator becomes negative as well (the denominator
is always positive). We call this phenomenon the reverting curve problem.
Let us ﬁrst introduce the discussion with the following observation. Because the Contingent leg does not
depend on the spread (see eq.(7)) and, on the other hand, the Fee leg is proportional to it (see eq.(8)), one
gets that
p?
k → p?
k−1 −
N

E[CgtLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]
	
not(n)(1 − rec(n)) ×
P
T (k)\T (k−1)
ti−ti−1
t?
k−t?
k−1δ(ti)
as spk(n,t0) → 0 .
Hence, because the second term of the limspk(n,t0)→0 p?
k expression is strictly positive, there exists a threshold
value sp?
k(n,t0) for the kth maturity spread such that p?
k < p?
k−1 for all spk(n,t0) 6 sp?
k(n,t0). Of course,
this cannot happen since a CDF must be an increasing function. This behavior is illustrated on Figure 4.
In order to be more precise on the threshold values leading to that strange behavior, we split the above
questions in the two following ones:
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Figure 4: Evolution of the Contingent and Fee legs and the associated risk-neutral cumulative PD leading to
a zero-MtM for various spread levels for spk(n,t0) : 0 6 s1 6 s2 6 s3. Example with k = 2 (corresponding
to the numerical example given in Section 5.
1. How does the probability p?
k vary with spk(n,t0) ?
2. What is the minimum value of spk(n,t0) (k > 1) such that pk > pk−1 (which precisely corresponds to
our threshold sp?
k(n,t0))?
These questions will be addressed in the two following subsections.
3.2.1 About the monotonic behavior of the curve p?
k vs spk(n,t0)
Does the spread spk(n,t0) vary monotonously with p?
k on the interval p?
k−1 6 p?
k 6 1 ? A natural answer is
yes, but let’s check that to give credit to our formula. Using the notation of Section 2.2.3 and eq.(9), one
can see that the implied fair spread spk(n,t0) equals
N{E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t
?
k−1,...),...]}
(1−rec(n))not(n) +
P
T (k)\T (k−1)
ti−ti−1
t?
k−t?
k−1δ(ti)(p?
k − p?
k−1)
(1−p?
k−1)
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ
1−rec(n) +
N{E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]}
(1−rec(n))not(n)spk−1(n,t0) −
(p?
k−p?
k−1)
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ
„
ti−t?
k−1−∆i
t?
k−t?
k−1
«
1−rec(n)
, (10)
which is a function of the following form in p?
k :
spk(n,t0) =
a + b(p?
k − p?
k−1)
c − d(p?
k − p?
k−1)
, (11)
where a,b,c,d and p?
k−p?
k−1 are positive numbers. This means that if p?
k increases, so will do the numerator in
the right-hand side of eq.(11) and its denomerator will decrease. Hence, as long as the above denominator is
positive, spk(n,t0) will be positive and monotonously increasing with p?
k. The threshold spread corresponding
to p?
k = 1 is noted sp∞
k (n,t0) (see the Figure 5 for an illustration).
To see that the spreads are always positive (i.e. to see that the above denominator is always positive)
whatever is p?
k−1 6 p?
k 6 1, it is suﬃcient to prove that sp∞
k (n,t0) > 0. Indeed, the p?
k = 1 condition yields
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Figure 5: Evolution of the Fair Value spread spk(n,t0) vs the probability p?
k ranging in p?
k−1 6 p?
k 6 1. The
spread sp?
k(n,t0) corresponds to p?
k = p?
k−1 and sp∞
k (n,t0) corresponds to p?
k = 1 (curve given for illustration
purposes only). The values are taken from the numerical example given in Section 5, with k = 2.
the lowest achievable bound for the above denominator: if we don’t get a negative value in that case, we will
never have a negative value for spk(n,t0) under the constraint that p?
k−1 6 p?
k 6 1. To show that, observe
that
c >
(1 − p?
k−1)
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ
1 − rec(n)
,
while
d(1 − p?
k−1) =
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ
ti−t
?
k−1−∆i
t?
k−t?
k−1
1 − rec(n)
(1 − p?
k−1)
<
(1 − p?
k−1)
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ
1 − rec(n)
,
where the above strict inequality results from that each of the terms
ti−t
?
k−1−∆i
t?
k−t?
k−1 is strictly lower than 1. This
shows that for p?
k−1 6 p?
k 6 1, the lowest possible value for c−d(p?
k −p?
k−1) is strictly positive, and so is the
Fair value spread spk(n,t0) in that probability range.
3.2.2 On the reversion threshold of CDS curves
Let us now derive the threshold value for the spreads. From equation (9), the spread sp?
k(n,t0) satisﬁes
N{E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]}
not(n)
sp?
k(n,t0) − spk−1(n,t0)
spk−1(n,t0)
+ sp?
k(n,t0)(1 − p?
k−1)
X
T (k)\T (k−1)
δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ
= 0 ,
i.e.
N{E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]}
not(n)

1 −
sp?
k(n,t0)
spk−1(n,t0)

= sp?
k(n,t0)(1 − p?
k−1)
X
T (k)\T (k−1)
δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ
.
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Rearranging these terms leads quickly to
sp?
k(n,t0) =
spk−1(n,t0)
1 +
spk−1(n,t0)not(n)(1−p?
k−1)
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ
N{E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]}
. (12)
The above equation conﬁrms, as expected from the qualitative analysis, that i) there exists a minimum
value sp?
k(n,t0) for spk(n,t0) such that probability axioms are met, and ii) that this threshold value can be
(and actually is always) lower than spk−1(n,t0), i.e. any CDS curve may be decreasing.
Actually, the qualitative analysis performed in Section 7.4 already showed that such a threshold should
exist in order to avoid a sure (i.e. deterministic) arbitrage. Let us now turn to the interpretation of the above
analytical threshold value from a business perspective. As it will be shown below, there is no redundancy
between the qualitative and quantitative results.
4 On the business meaning of the threshold value sp?
k(n,t0)
To answer the question “what is the meaning of this threshold value on spreads”, we will tackle the problem
upside down. Let us ﬁrst answer the question “What is the speciﬁc value sp??
k (n,t0) of the spread spk(n,t0)
such that the NPV of the FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k,...) equals those of FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...) (and similarly for the
Contingent Leg as the MtM is zero) ?”
By deﬁnition, sp??
k (n,t0) is the value of the spread spk(n,t0) such that
N

E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]
	
= N {E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k,...),...]} ,
meaning with that spread, you have a period of
t
?
k−t
?
k−1
γ years of protection for free as a protection buyer ?
The spread sp??
k (n,t0) satisﬁes
N

E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]
	
= N {E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k,...),...]}
=
sp??
k (n,t0)
spk−1(n,t0)
N

E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]
	
+sp??
k (n,t0)not(n) ×
X
T (k)\T (k−1)
h
δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ

1 −
h
p?
k−1 + (p − p?
k−1)
ti − t?
k−1 − ∆i
t?
k − t?
k−1
ii
.
Applying consecutively basic algebraic relationships (see the Appendix 7.3 for more detailed calculations),
one gets
sp??
k (n,t0) =
spk−1(n,t0)
1 +
spk−1(n,t0)not(n)(1−p?
k−1)
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ
N{E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]}
. (13)
Hence, we obtain the remarkable result that
sp?
k(n,t0) = sp??
k (n,t0) . (14)
In other words, the spread sp?
k(n,t0) corresponding to p?
k = p?
k−1 (the lowest k-th maturity spread such
that the cumulative default probability function is not decreasing between t?
k−1 and t?
k) equals the spread
sp??
k (n,t0), which gives a lower bound for spk(n,t0) such that the reverted curve does not imply arbitrage
opportunities as understood by the model, which is working with (discounted) expected values. This is
illustrated on Figure 6.
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(a) spk(n,t0) > spk−1(n,t0) and spk(n,t0) > sp?
k(n,t0)
: no expected arbitrage
(b) spk(n,t0) 6 spk−1(n,t0) and spk(n,t0) > sp?
k(n,t0)
: no expected arbitrage
(c) spk(n,t0) < sp?
k(n,t0) : expected arbitrage (d) spk(n,t0) < sp?
k(n,t0) and total no-default Fee leg
payment of k-th maturity smaller than total no-default
Fee leg payment of k − 1-th maturity : certain arbitrage
Figure 6: Evolution of the no-default payment curve of the Fee leg in time (increasing, capped curves) for the
k −1th (dashed) and k-th (solid) maturities, and discounted expected value of Fee leg payments (horizontal
dashed and solid curves, respectively). The curves have been smoothed so that the daily step structure
due to our discrete day-by-day time scale are no longer visible. Arbitrage or no-arbitrage in expected value
depending on the spread spk(n,t0) with respect to the threshold value sp?
k(n,t0). Certain arbitrage depends
on the total no-default Fee leg payment.
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Consequently, while the previous development gives a threshold value for avoiding an arbitrage in expected
value, the qualitative analysis only showed that the threshold value preventing sure arbitrage must exist. A
similar development than the one performed above shows that, as expected, this “no arbitrage in expected
value threshold” is more restrictive than the “certain arbitrage one”. In other words, the qualitative analysis
explains a part of the problem, but issues might still occur even if no sure arbitrage is observed: there is
no need that the CDS curve yields a certain arbitrage for blocking the CDS pricer (which is dealing with
discounted expected values). Hence, even CDS curves not yielding sure arbitrage might be blocking. The
eﬀective threshold is more restrictive because it prevents arbitrage in expected values as well.
5 Numerical example
We shall ﬁrst consider a “toy” example in which only few computations are involved. Next, the real-life
example of CDS on Residential Capital LLC corresponding to the dashed CDS curve in Figure 1 will be
considered, showing that real-life CDS curves might yield to a blocking of the pricer.
5.1 Toy example
We consider a 3-maturity deal (that is three tenors are available for the underlying name, m = 3) on a fake
name n with the maturity dates 22/12/2008 (one-year CDS), 21/12/2009 (two-year CDS) and 20/12/2010
(three-year CDS). The contract is assumed to start at the MtM date, t0 = 15/11/2007. In order that
credit events occurring during the day corresponding to the maturity dates are covered, we have, according
to our convention, to increase them by one day in our pricing model (this is because we assumed for the
simplicity of the equations that the maturity date was excluded from the protection duration). We assume
that γ = 360, sp1(n,t0) = 459.7871, sp2(n,t0) = 349.5433, sp3(n,t0) = 366.8158. The involved coupon
dates and associated discount factors are shown on Table 1. We used the assumption that if a name defaults
between two coupon dates, then, in expectation, the default will occur in the middle of the time interval:
∆i = (ti − ti−1)/2, which is consistent with our piecewise linear model for cumulative default probabilities,
as shown in Appendix 7.2.
label ti δ(ti) (ti − ti−1)/γ
t0 15/11/2007 1 -
t1 20/12/2007 0.9971 0.0972
t2 20/03/2008 0.9896 0.2528
t3 20/06/2008 0.9820 0.2556
t4 22/09/2008 0.9743 0.2611
t5 = t?
1 23/12/2008 0.9669 0.2528
t6 20/03/2009 0.9599 0.2417
t7 22/06/2009 0.9524 0.2611
t8 21/09/2009 0.9452 0.0.2528
t9 = t?
2 22/12/2009 0.9380 0.2556
t10 22/03/2010 0.9341 0.2500
t11 21/06/2010 0.9270 0.2528
t12 20/09/2010 0.9200 0.2528
t13 = t?
3 21/12/2010 0.9130 0.2556
Table 1: Input data of our numerical example (rounded to fourth digit after the coma.)
From the equations developed in this paper, one gets the following results:
In the previous sections, we have developed a procedure to ﬁnd the maximum level of reversion for a CDS
curve. The two threshold spreads are, according to our equations : sp?
2(n,t0) ≈ 251.6348 and sp?
3(n,t0) ≈
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k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
Fee Leg 48087.7559 66162.436284 97846.7593
Contingent Leg 48087.7559 66162.436284 97846.7593
p?
k = P(τ 6 t?
k) 0.0982 0.1363 0.2049
Table 2: Results: the default probabilities p?
k lead to a Mark-to-Market being zero up to the 15-th digit
using Microsoft Excel (here: number rounded to the fourth digit after the coma).
245.1053. With these values instead of the original spreads (sp2(n,t0) ← 251.6348, sp3(n,t0) ← 245.1053),
we ﬁnd the following probabilities: p?
1 = p?
2 ≈ 0.0982, p?
3 ≈ 0.1391. With this specif value for sp2(n,t0), we
have yet another value for the third spread : sp?
3(n,t0) ≈ 174.6668. The set of spreads sp1(n,t0) ← 0.04598
, sp2(n,t0) ← 251.6348 and sp3(n,t0) ← 174.6668 would lead to a constant cumulative probability function
on the [t?
1,t?
3] time interval : p?
1 = p?
2 = p?
3 ≈ 0.0982, which proves the consistency of our equations.
5.2 Real-life example
In this section, we will compute the cumulative default probability curve from the dashed CDS curve shown
in Figure 1. This curve corresponds to the CDS spreads of Residential Capital LLC on 2007 August 20th.
Assume we are on that date and that we want to infer the cumulative default probability curve from this set
of market quotes. It will be shown that this CDS curve is not bootstrappable, meaning that it is not possible
to get a consistent cumulative probability curve using our model. Therefore, let us focus on the three ﬁrst
maturities: the 1-year, 2-year and 3-year spreads with spreads equal to 2840.7 bps, 2531.2 and 1691.8. The
corresponding maturity dates are 22/092008, 21/092010 and 20/09/2012. The recovery rate is 40% and the
number of days in a year is γ = 360. The discount factors δ(ti) are given by e
−r
ti−t0
γ with r = 3%.
Recall that, because the market convention assumes that the protection period also includes the maturity
date while, in our equations, it was not the case: we have to increase the maturity dates by one day, in order
to price the related deals correctly with our framework (t?
i ← t?
i + 1).
label ti δ(ti) (ti − ti−1)/γ
t0 20/08/2007 1 -
t1 20/09/2007 0.9974 0.0861
t2 20/12/2007 0.9899 0.2528
t3 20/03/2008 0.9824 0.2528
t4 20/06/2008 0.9749 0.2556
t5 = t?
1 23/09/2008 0.9672 0.2639
t6 22/12/2008 0.9599 0.2500
t7 20/03/2009 0.9529 0.2444
t8 22/06/2009 0.9455 0.2611
t9 = t?
2 22/09/2009 0.9383 0.2556
t10 21/12/2009 0.9341 0.2500
t11 22/03/2010 0.9270 0.2528
t12 21/06/2010 0.9200 0.2528
t13 = t?
3 21/09/2010 0.9130 0.2556
Table 3: Input data of our real-life numerical example (rounded to fourth digit after the coma.)
From the equations developed in this paper, one gets the results shown in Table 4 (notional is 1000,000).
The obtained cumulative default probabilities curve does not consist in an increasing sequence, which is not
consistent with probability theory. This is because the CDS spread curve is too reverted given our set of as-
sumptions and conventions. Our spread thresholds are sp?
2(n,t0) ≈ 1723.4584 bps and sp?
3(n,t0) ≈ 1962.7514
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bps, which is larger than sp?
3(n,t0) = 1691.8 Therefore, the 3-year spread is below the corresponding spread
threshold, and the pricer should block in that case.
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
Fee Leg 245169.1097 339954.5813 298855.7416
Contingent Leg 245169.1097 339954.5813 298855.7416
p?
k = P(τ 6 t?
k) 0.4170 0.5834 0.5093
Table 4: Results: the default probabilities p?
k lead to a Mark-to-Market being zero up to the 15-th digit
using Microsoft Excel (here: number rounded to the fourth digit after the coma).
6 Conclusions
In this paper, a very simple model for pricing Credit Default Swap products has been proposed. Exactly as
more involved models do, our approach relies on a given family of functions for the cumulative probability
function, which is the piecewise linear function. The proposed model does not require additional parameters
to tune, like e.g. hazard rate; all the remaining values are inferred by the market. However, in spite of
its simplicity, this model ﬁts pretty well to the market because it involves practical conventions, and that
only few assumptions have been made. If desired, this model could still beneﬁt from an additional degree
of freedom, which can either be implied by the model, or can be tuned to come up with best and worst
case fees. For the rest, up to the assumptions clearly stated in the introduction, the model is exact. Even
though quite eﬃcient, the purpose of our model is not really to compete with other existing ones in the
academic literature. The main advantage of this model is its manageability: the equations, even though
quite lengthy, are simple to manipulate, so that a lot of analytical expressions are easily available, like e.g.
default probabilities, fair spreads, Mark-to-Market and sensitivities. Consequently, the model suits pretty
well for understanding and to studying unexpected behaviors of CDS pricing engines. As indicated in the
title of this report, this goal was the main motivation for developing the piecewise linear model.
In this analysis, we decided to focus on the so-called reverted CDS curve issue, which refers to the possible
CDS pricer blockings resulting from the fact that the spread for, say, a 5-year CDS contract is “suﬃciently
lower” than the one applying for a 3-year contract. Analysing this problem was the second aim of this report.
A qualitative development has been suggested to convince the reader that a spread threshold must exist,
otherwise arbitrage opportunities may come into play. A deeper theoretical study conﬁrms that statement,
and further gives an analytical formula for this threshold. Finally, a business meaning of this threshold value
has been given in terms of arbitrage opportunities in expected value. One consequence of this result is that
the k − 1-th maturity contract would never be entered knowing the k-th maturity contract when strongly
reverted CDS curves are observed (the only reason for entering that contract would be based on possible
liquidity issues, resulting from a non-rational behavior of the market, and that are not taken into account
in our pricing model).
7 Appendix
7.1 NPV of the expected Fee leg
Hereafter, we justify the i-th term in the sum in the right-hand side of expression :
N {E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
1,...),...]} = sp1(n,t0)not(n)
N
0
X
i=1

δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ

1 − p

ti − t0 − ∆i
t?
1 − t0

.
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Remind that we make the hypothesis that cash ﬂows can only occur at coupon dates. This has the
following consequence: the Fee leg payments are made at any coupon date coming before the maturity and
before the possible default time. In case of default, the accrual payment due to the protection received for
the period between the default time and the previous coupon date will be paid on the ﬁrst coupon date after
the default time. For the Contingent leg, the payment is made on the ﬁrst coupon date after the default time,
provided that a default occurs before the maturity date. In both cases, this means that only the discount
factors at those coupon dates will be used.
The term we want to focus on is
sp1(n,t0)not(n)δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ

1 − p

ti − t0 − ∆i
t?
1 − t0

and represents the expected (Fee Leg) payments related to the time interval [ti−1,ti[. To prove this, let us
detail the three possible scenarios:
1. the default occurs before ti−1 (τ < ti−1);
2. the default occurs before ti but after ti−1 (ti−1 6 τ < ti);
3. the default occurs after ti (τ > ti).
In the ﬁrst case, the amount to pay is zero: the contribution of that event in the whole expectation is
0 ×
X
τ<ti−1
{P(τ = τ)} = 0 .
In the third case, the payment for the whole period between the consecutive coupon dates ti−1 and ti has
to be paid at ti, so that the NPV of the payment is
sp1(n,t0)not(n)δ(ti)
γ
P
τ>ti{(ti − ti−1)P(τ = τ)} which
reduces to
sp1(n,t0)not(n)δ(ti)
γ
(ti − ti−1)P(τ > ti) .
Finally, in the second case, the payment is
sp1(n,t0)not(n)δ(ti)
γ
P
ti−16τ<ti(τ − ti−1)P(τ = τ). By using
conditioning, this last probability can be rewritten as
P(τ = τ|ti−1 6 τ < ti)P(ti−1 6 τ < ti) ,
because P(τ = τ|ti−1 6 τ < ti)P(ti−1 6 τ < ti) (the overline denotes the complementary event) has a zero
contribution in the above sum since P(τ = τ|ti−1 6 τ < ti) = 0 for any τ satisfying ti−1 6 τ < ti. Conse-
quently, the contribution of the second case to the NPV of the expected Fee leg payment reduces to
sp1(n,t0)not(n)δ(ti)
γ
X
τ
(τ − ti−1)P(τ = τ|ti−1 6 τ < ti)
| {z }
∆i
P(ti−1 6 τ < ti)
7.2 Computation of implied ∆i
A value for ∆i is implied by our model. By deﬁnition, and using Bayes’ rule, one gets
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∆i = E[τ −ti−1|ti−1 6 τ < ti]
=
X
τ
(τ − ti−1)P(τ = τ|ti−1 6 τ < ti)
=
X
ti−16τ<ti
(τ − ti−1)
P(τ = τ ; ti−1 6 τ < ti)
P(ti−1 6 τ < ti)
=
P
ti−16τ<ti(τ − ti−1)P(τ = τ)
P
ti−16τ<ti P(τ = τ)
On the other hand, we have
P(τ = τ) =

p?
k−1 + (p?
k − p?
k−1)
(τ + 1) − t?
k−1
t?
k − t?
k−1

| {z }
P(τ<τ+1 day)=P(τ6τ)
−

p?
k−1 + (p?
k − p?
k−1)
τ − t?
k−1
t?
k − t?
k−1

| {z }
P(τ<τ)
= (p?
k − p?
k−1)
(τ + 1) − τ
t?
k − t?
k−1
=
p?
k − p?
k−1
t?
k − t?
k−1
,
and this leads to
∆i =
P
ti−16τ<ti(τ − ti−1) × 1
P
ti−16τ<ti ×1
=
PNi
j=0 j
PNi
j=1 1
where Ni is the number of days between ti−1 (included) and ti (excluded). Finally, we get
∆i =
Ni(Ni+1)
2
Ni
≈
ti − ti−1
2
.
7.3 Detailed calculation
For shorting equations, deﬁne νi
. =
ti−t
?
k−1−∆i
t?
k−t?
k−1 . Then:
N

E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]
	
= N {E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k,...),...]}
=
sp??
k (n,t0)
spk−1(n,t0)
N

E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]
	
+sp??
k (n,t0)not(n) ×
X
T (k)\T (k−1)
h
δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ

1 −
h
p?
k−1 + (p?
k − p?
k−1)νi
ii
.
i.e. from eq.( 9)
spk−1(n,t0) − sp??
k (n,t0)
spk−1(n,t0)
N

E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]
	
sp??
k (n,t0)not(n)
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equals
(1 − p?
k−1)
X
T (k)\T (k−1)
δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ
−


X
T (k)\T (k−1)
δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ
νi

 ×
N{E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t
?
k−1,...),...]}
(1−rec(n))not(n)
sp
??
k (n,t0)−spk−1(n,t0)
spk−1(n,t0) +
sp
??
k (n,t0)
1−rec(n) (1 − p?
k−1)
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ
P
T (k)\T (k−1)
ti−ti−1
t?
k−t?
k−1δ(ti) +
sp??
k (n,t0)
1−rec(n)
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ νi
.
Equivalently,
spk−1(n,t0)−sp
??
k (n,t0)
spk−1(n,t0)
{E[N FeeLeg(n,t0,t
?
k−1,...),...]}
sp??
k (n,t0)not(n) ×
nP
T (k)\T (k−1)
ti−ti−1
t?
k−t?
k−1δ(ti) +
sp
??
k (n,t0)
1−rec(n)
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ νi
o
(15)
equals
(1 − p?
k−1)
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ
P
T (k)\T (k−1)
ti−ti−1
t?
k−t?
k−1δ(ti) +
sp
??
k (n,t0)
1−rec(n)
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ νi

−
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ νi

×
n
N{E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t
?
k−1,...),...]}
(1−rec(n))not(n)
sp
??
k (n,t0)−spk−1(n,t0)
spk−1(n,t0) +
sp
??
k (n,t0)
1−rec(n) (1 − p?
k−1)
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ
o
,
and, the last hand-side, after some simpliﬁcations, yields.
(1 − p?
k−1)
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ
P
T (k)\T (k−1)
ti−ti−1
t?
k−t?
k−1δ(ti)

−
P
T (k)\T (k−1) δ(ti)
ti−ti−1
γ νi
n
N{E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t
?
k−1,...),...]}
(1−rec(n))not(n)
sp
??
k (n,t0)−spk−1(n,t0)
spk−1(n,t0)
o
. (16)
By equating eq.(15) and eq.(16), one gets
spk−1(n,t0) − sp??
k (n,t0)
spk−1(n,t0)
N

E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]
	
= sp??
k (n,t0)not(n)(1−p?
k−1)
X
T (k)\T (k−1)
δ(ti)
ti − ti−1
γ
,
leading to eq.(13).
7.4 Reversion threshold in a certain arbitrage case
There is a certain arbitrage if, whenever occurs the possible default, the Fee leg for the k-th maturity is
less than the k − 1 th maturity one. Because the Fee leg is linear in time (see Figure 6), there is certain
arbitrage if and only if the no default value of the k-th maturity Fee leg is lower than the no-default value
of the k − 1-th one. This leads to a threshold value (lower bound) for spk(n,t0) given spk−1(n,t0), noted
sp
†
k(n,t0).
In the certain arbitrage case, the threshold value has the same form than sp?
k(n,t0) but where
N

E[FeeLeg(n,t0,t?
k−1,...),...]
	
/(1 − p?
k)
is replaced by the no-default value of the payment for the k-th maturity. On the other hand, because
the no default value of the Fee leg payments are obtained using the same formula than the expected Fee
leg when setting probabilities (p and p?
k) to zero, quick algebraic manipulations show that (1 − p?
k) times
the no-default value of the payments is lower than the NPV of the expected Fee leg, so that one obtains
sp
†
k(n,t0) < sp?
k(n,t0). Hence, the no arbitrage in expected value yields a stronger condition in terms of
maximum reversion level.[Cariboni (2004)]
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